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TRIAL EVIDENCE 2011: ADVOCACY, ANALYSIS, & 
ILLUSTRATIONS 
Martin A. Schwartz,
*
 Deborah Jones Merritt,
** 
and Hon. William G. 
Young
***
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
PROFESSOR SCHWARTZ: This segment will review fun-
damental evidentiary principles as well as recent developments in 
evidence law, concentrating on the Federal Rules of Evidence.1  
Many of New York‟s evidence principles mirror the Federal Rules.2  
New York is one of the relatively few states that does not have an 
evidence code; most New York evidence law derives from decisions 
of the New York courts.  While mainly similar, there are some differ-
ences between federal evidence law and New York evidence law. 
 
* Professor of Law, Touro Law Center. B.B.A., cum laude, 1966, City College of New York; 
J.D., magna cum laude, 1968, Brooklyn Law School; L.L.M., 1973, New York University 
School of Law.  Professor Schwartz has authored leading treatises including Section 1983 
Litigation: Claims and Defenses (4th ed. 2004-2006), Section 1983 Litigation: Federal Evi- 
dence (4th ed. 2007) and Section 1983 Litigation: Jury Instructions (2007).  He is co-author 
of Section 1983 Litigation: Statutory Attorney’s Fees (3d ed. 1991 & Supp. 2011).  Professor 
Schwartz is also the author of a bi-monthly column for the New York Law Journal entitled 
“Public Interest Law.”  He is lead author of Section 1983 Litigation, Second Edition (Federal 
Judicial Center 2008).  He chairs the Practising Law Institute‟s annual program on Section 
1983 litigation and Trial Evidence and co-chairs its annual Supreme Court Review program.  
This Article is based on a presentation given at the Practising Law Institute‟s Trial Evidence 
Symposium held in New York, New York.  The author expresses appreciation for the valua-
ble assistance of the editors of the Touro Law Review in the preparation of this Article. 
** John Deaver Drinko/Baker & Hostetler Chair in Law, Moritz College of Law, The Ohio 
State University. 
*** United States District Court Judge, District of Massachusetts. 
1 All references to the Federal Rules of Evidence are to the rules in effect before Decem-
ber 1, 2011. 
2 Clemente v. Blumenberg, 705 N.Y.S.2d 792, 798 (Sup. Ct. 1999) (“New York common 
law and the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR) contain many of the same prin-
ciples of evidence contained in the FRE.”). 
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II. FUNDAMENTAL EVIDENCE PRINCIPLES AND CONCEPTS 
PROFESSOR SCHWARTZ: When looking at evidentiary is-
sues, one should begin with Federal Rules 4013, 4024, and 403.5  Rule 
402 and 403 principles lay the groundwork for analyzing other evi-
dentiary issues.  Rule 402 makes a very basic point that to be admiss-
ible evidence must be relevant.6  This premise is one of the few abso-
lutes in the law of evidence.  On the other hand, if the evidence is 
relevant, the best we can say is that it may be admissible.7 
The definition of “relevance” is located in Federal Rule of 
Evidence 401 and is consistent with common law definitions.8  The 
language has changed slightly from the common law which referred 
to “materiality.”  The federal definition does not use the concept of 
materiality, but instead refers to facts “of consequence in determining 
the action . . . .”9  According to Rule 401, “Evidence is relevant if: (a) 
it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probably than it 
would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in 
determining the action.”10  Essentially, Rule 401 requires that there 
be a logical relationship between the evidence sought to be intro-
duced and a “fact . . . of consequence” in the case.11 
The facts of consequence can come from three potential plac-
es: 1) the substantive law governing the particular controversy; 2) the 
 
3 FED. R. EVID. 401 (“Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact more 
or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of consequence in 
determining the action.”). 
4 FED. R. EVID. 402 (“All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by 
the Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules 
prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority.  Evidence which is not re-
levant is not admissible.”). 
5 FED. R. EVID. 403 (“Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value 
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or mis-
leading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation 
of cumulative evidence.”). 
6 FED. R. EVID. 402. 
7 See FED. R. EVID. 402 advisory committee‟s note (“Not all relevant evidence is admissi-
ble.  The exclusion of relevant evidence occurs in a variety of situations and may be called 
for by these rules, by the Rules of Civil and Criminal Procedure, by Bankruptcy Rules, by 
Act of Congress, or by constitutional considerations.”). 
8 FED. R. EVID. 401 (“ „Relevant evidence‟ means evidence having any tendency to make 
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more prob-
able or less probable than it would be without the evidence.”). 
9 FED. R. EVID. 401. 
10 Id. 
11 See id. 
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credibility of a witness; and 3) background facts that may help the 
jury understand how the controversy came about.  The trial judge 
must analyze the complaint and the answer to determine the claims 
and defenses.  Then, by turning to the substantive law governing 
those claims and defenses, the trial judge is able to determine the 
“facts of consequence.”12 
 
HON. WILLIAM G. YOUNG: For example, in an intentional 
interference with contract case, there has to be “(1) the existence of a 
valid contract, (2) defendant‟s knowledge of the contract, (3) defen-
dant‟s intentional procuring of the breach of the contract, and (4) 
damages.”13  In a negligence case, there has to be a duty, a negligent 
discharge of the duty that has to be the proximate cause of some in-
jury, and damages.14  However, determining the logical relevance of 
evidence can sometimes be difficult. 
 
PROFESSOR SCHWARTZ: Notwithstanding that difficulty, 
the standard regarding logical relevance of evidence is not very de-
manding.  The rule itself says, “any tendency.”15  It is not required 
that the evidence necessarily prove the fact.16  For example, in United 
States v. Poindexter,17 the defendant was charged with drug posses-
sion.18  The government agent found a container with drugs, and the 
defense wanted to show that the defendant‟s fingerprints were not on 
the container.19  The government objected on the ground that that cir-
cumstance did not necessarily prove that the defendant did not pos-
sess the drugs.20  The trial judge sided with the government,21 and the 
 
12 See Robin Kundis Craig, When Daubert Gets Erie: Medical Certainty and Medical Ex-
pert Testimony in Federal Court, 77 DENV. U. L. REV. 69, 83 (1999) (“Because in diversity 
cases the underlying state-law claim or defense establishes which facts are „of consequence 
to the determination of the action,‟ state law necessarily influences the court‟s application of 
the Federal Rules.”). 
13 Key Bank of N. N.Y. v. Lake Placid Co., 479 N.Y.S.2d 862, 868 (App. Div. 1984) (cit-
ing Israel v. Wood Dolson Co., Inc., 134 N.E.2d 97, 99 (N.Y. 1956)). 
14 See Lorencz v. Ford Motor Co., 483 N.W.2d 844, 846 (Mich. 1992) (explaining the 
elements of a negligence claim in a tortious action). 
15 FED. R. EVID. 401. 
16 See id. (requiring that the evidence make the fact merely “more probable or less proba-
ble”). 
17 942 F.2d 354 (6th Cir. 1991). 
18 Id. at 357. 
19 Id. at 357-59. 
20 Id. at 358. 
21 Id. at 358-59. 
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circuit court reversed.22 
The trial court‟s ruling was flawed because evidence may 
well be relevant even though it does not necessarily prove a “fact of 
consequence.”23  As Poindexter illustrates, negative evidence may 
sometimes be relevant; the defendant sought to show that his finger-
prints were not on the container.24  In the words of one Sixth Circuit 
judge, to be relevant, “evidence . . . simply has to advance the ball.”25  
In other words, the evidence does not have to score a touchdown.  
Trial judges understand that attorneys typically must piece together 
various types of circumstantial evidence to prove a particular fact. 
Federal trial judges have Rule 403 on their minds all the 
time.26  Rule 403 is the principal means by which federal trial judges 
(and their state judge counterparts) control the admissibility of the 
evidence.27  Rule 403 provides that even though the evidence is rele-
vant, the trial judge can exclude that evidence if she finds that its 
probative value is “substantially outweighed by the danger of” one or 
more of the enumerated factors.28  One factor is “unfair prejudice.”29  
Often, out of convenience, attorneys and judges refer to the factor as 
“prejudice,” but the modifier “unfair” is important.  The Advisory 
Committee‟s Note to Rule 403 defines “unfair prejudice” as evidence 
that has a “tendency to [bring about a result on an] improper basis.”30  
A prime example would be evidence bringing about a result on an 
emotional basis rather than through an intellectual evaluation of the 
 
22 Poindexter, 942 F.2d at 359-60. 
23 See FED. R. EVID. 401 advisory committee‟s note. 
24 Poindexter, 942 F.2d. at 358, 360. 
25 Dortch v. Fowler, 588 F.3d 396, 401 (6th Cir. 2009). 
26 See, e.g., United States v. Dockery, 955 F.2d 50, 54 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (“[T]he Govern-
ment‟s right to introduce its proof is always subject to the trial court‟s responsibility under    
. . . [Rule] 403 to limit unduly prejudicial or cumulative evidence.”); Langer v. Presbyterian 
Med. Ctr. of Phila., Nos. 87-4000, 91-1814, 88-1064, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15118, at *10 
(E.D. Pa. Oct. 19, 1993) (“[I]n the efforts to give the parties the process they are due, one is 
always mindful of the tempering effect of . . . [Rule] 403 . . . .”). 
27 See United States v. Geisen, 612 F.3d 471, 495 (6th Cir. 2010). 
28 FED. R. EVID. 403 (“The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, con-
fusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting 
cumulative evidence.”). 
29 Id. 
30 FED. R. EVID. 403 advisory committee‟s note (“ „Unfair prejudice‟ within its context 
means an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not 
necessarily, an emotional one.”). 
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evidence.31  However, it is crucial to keep in mind that even evidence 
that has a tendency to bring about a result on an emotional basis will 
be excluded only if “its probative value is substantially outweighed” 
by that specific danger.”32  Some of the other factors listed in Rule 
403—”confusion of the issues”33 and “misleading the jury”34—seem 
to overlap.  There also seems to be some overlap in the time factors.  
For example, “needlessly presenting cumulative evidence,” “wasting 
time,” and “undue delay,” all overlap to some extent.35 
Another important aspect to note about Rule 403 is that it is 
an exclusionary rule.36  It authorizes the judge to exclude relevant 
evidence,37 but it is an exclusionary rule that favors admissibility by 
placing the burden on the opposing party to show that the probative 
value of the evidence is “substantially outweighed” by one or more of 
the countervailing factors.  It is important to emphasize both that 
Rule 403 heavily weighs in favor of admissibility, and grants tre-
mendous discretion to the trial judge. 
In Sprint/United Management Co. v. Mendelsohn,38 the Su-
preme Court stressed the fact that trial judges have very broad discre-
tion in making Rule 403 determinations.39  This discretion includes 
the option of only admitting certain parts of the evidence to mitigate 
the unfair prejudice.  Another option for the judge is issuing a limit-
ing instruction concerning the evidence.40  Giving a limiting instruc-
tion to the jury may successfully focus the jury on the relevant as-
pects of the evidence as well as decrease the potential for unfair 
prejudice.  On the other hand, in some circumstances, counsel for a 
party who is entitled to a limiting instruction may choose not to re-
 
31 Id. 
32 FED. R. EVID. 403 (emphasis added). 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Id.; see, e.g., United States v. Stevens, 935 F.2d 1380, 1399 (3d Cir. 1991) (“In sum, we 
are persuaded that the probative value of [the] proposed testimony was substantially out-
weighed by considerations of „undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumu-
lative evidence.‟ ” (quoting FED. R. EVID. 403)). 
36 United States v. Tse, 375 F.3d 148, 162 (1st Cir. 2004). 
37 See United States v. Schumacher, 238 F.3d 978, 980 (8th Cir. 2001). 
38 552 U.S. 379 (2008). 
39 Id. at 384 (“In deference to a district court‟s familiarity with the details of the case and 
its greater experience in evidentiary matters, courts of appeals afford broad discretion to a 
district court‟s evidentiary rulings.”). 
40 See FED. R. EVID. 105 (“If the court admits evidence that is admissible against a party or 
for a purpose—but not against another party or for another purpose—the court, on timely 
request, must restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the jury accordingly.”). 
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quest one for fear that the instruction in question might highlight the 
evidence in question by having it singled out for the instruction. 
 
HON. WILLIAM G. YOUNG: Another issue which arises 
under Rule 403 is whether evidence can be admitted when the fact 
has already been stipulated to.  The Supreme Court, in deciding Old 
Chief v. United States,41 held that if the defendant charged with being 
a felon in possession of a weapon stipulates to the felony, the court 
should not allow the prosecution to prove that felony.42 
 
PROFESSOR MERRITT: Old Chief has been read quite nar-
rowly.  It is an unusual opinion with a narrow holding accompanied 
by broad dictum that cuts contrary to the holding.  Following Old 
Chief‟s holding, lower courts have allowed defendants to stipulate to 
the prior felony in felon-in-possession cases; judges have then ex-
cluded evidence of the particular felony as unfairly prejudicial.43  
Nevertheless, in most other prosecutions, the lower courts follow the 
Supreme Court‟s dictum that “a criminal defendant may not stipulate 
or admit his way out of the full evidentiary force of the case as the 
Government chooses to present it.”44 
If there is one other area in which trial courts might apply Old 
Chief‟s holding, it could be child pornography.  Defendants have ar-
gued that it is unnecessary to show this inflammatory pornography to 
the jury if the defendant stipulates that the material is child pornogra-
phy.45  Judges certainly do not like this material and might welcome a 
 
41 519 U.S. 172 (1997). 
42 Id. at 191-92. 
43 See, e.g., United States v. Coleman, 552 F.3d 853, 859 (D.C. Cir. 2009); United States 
v. Jones, 159 F.3d 969, 979 (6th Cir. 1998); United States v. Blake, 107 F.3d 651, 653 (8th 
Cir. 1997).  When trial judges violate Old Chief, however, appellate courts sometimes find 
the error harmless.  See, e.g., Jones, 159 F.3d at 979 (explaining that although the trial court 
erred by not accepting the defendant‟s admission of a prior conviction, the error was harm-
less in that there was still “overwhelming evidence” against the defendant in the case at bar). 
44 Old Chief, 519 U.S. at 186-87; see id. at 187 (“This is unquestionably true as a general 
matter.”).  For the reaction in the lower courts, see United States v. Jandreau, 611 F.3d 922, 
924 (8th Cir. 2010), which discusses cases distinguishing Old Chief and notes that the defen-
dant was “unable to direct us to any case that has expanded [Old Chief] beyond cases dealing 
with prior convictions . . . .”  Id. 
45 See, e.g., United States v. McCourt, 468 F.3d 1088, 1091 (8th Cir. 2006) (discussing the 
defendant‟s contention that his stipulation to possession of child pornography was sufficient 
under Old Chief to exclude admission of the physical evidence offered by the prosecution); 
United States v. Caldwell, 586 F.3d 338, 342 (5th Cir. 2009) (discussing the defendant‟s 
claim that excerpts from videos that he previously stipulated contained child pornography 
6
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stipulation keeping it out of the courtroom.  Yet, many judges do ad-
mit child pornography, recognizing its close association with the 
prosecution‟s case, and appellate courts have upheld those Rule 403 
decisions.46 
 
PROFESSOR SCHWARTZ: Rule 403 plays a vital role in the 
admissibility of physical evidence, that is, real and demonstrative 
evidence.  One type of real evidence that is commonly allowed in-
volves a party demonstrating his or her injury to the jury, on the 
theory that this evidence is more probative than alternative types of 
evidences, such as a photograph or testimony about the injury.47 
A memorable example of the potential power of demonstra-
tive evidence appears in the Hollywood film Philadelphia.48  In a 
poignant and moving scene from the 1993 award-winning film, Tom 
Hanks‟ character, a successful attorney, sues his former law firm un-
der the Americans with Disabilities Act for unfairly dismissing him 
due to his having AIDS.  Hanks‟ character was fired after lesions 
from his illness appeared on his face.  Hanks‟ attorney, while directly 
examining him, asks him to remove his shirt to show the jury the ap-
pearance of the AIDS lesions on his back; by the time of the trial, the 
lesions on his face had faded.  Upon emphatic objection from the de-
fense, the court allowed Hanks to bare his back.  This likely had a 
major impact on the jury. 
III. OTHER ACT, CHARACTER, HABIT, AND OTHER SPECIAL 
RELEVANCE ISSUES IN CIVIL CASES 
PROFESSOR MERRITT: Federal Rule of Evidence 404(a), 
also reflected in New York case law, states that one cannot use 
“[e]vidence of a person‟s character or a trait of character” to suggest 
that she acted in a specific way “on a particular [disputed] occa-
sion.”49  Our justice system rests on the premise that people are ac-
countable for the things they do, not for who they are or what they 
 
should not have been played for the jury). 
46 See, e.g., United States v. Polouizzi, 564 F.3d 142, 153 (2d Cir. 2009); McCourt, 468 
F.3d at 1091-93. 
47 See McCullough v. Filion, 378 F. Supp. 2d 241, 254 (W.D.N.Y. 2005) (noting that de-
monstrative evidence is admissible so long as the issue is material). 
48 PHILADELPHIA (TriStar Pictures 1993). 
49 FED. R. EVID. 404(a). 
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did in the past.50  Suppose, for example, that a man is a reckless 
drunken driver but has never hit anyone.  If, on the one day he is so-
ber, he happens to hit a pedestrian through no fault of his own, he 
should be tried based on what happened that day.  Neither events that 
occurred earlier in his life nor his general character are admissible 
under Rule 404(a). 
That rule, however, has numerous exceptions.  The most im-
portant exception is Federal Rule 404(b),51 which allows evidence of 
a party‟s bad acts if the proponent can show that the evidence serves 
a purpose other than demonstrating that the person has a bad charac-
ter or a tendency to act in a bad way.52  If the proponent can persua-
sively point to that other purpose, the court may allow evidence of 
the bad acts to demonstrate that other purpose.53  Suppose, for exam-
ple, that an elderly man falls down the stairs and dies after his son 
brushes against him near the top of the stairs.  The state charges the 
son with homicide, claiming that he pushed his father.  The son ar-
gues that the fall was an accident; he testifies that he stumbled against 
his father rather than pushing him.  Rule 404(b) allows evidence of 
other acts to prove intent,54 so the judge may allow the prosecutor to 
introduce evidence that the son attempted to poison his father the day 
before the staircase “accident.”  The attempted poisoning suggests 
that the son is a bad person, but it also suggests that the “stumble” 
was an intentional push.55 
 
PROFESSOR SCHWARTZ: This issue was presented in 
Sprint.  In Sprint, individual “X” made the decision to fire the plain-
tiff, and the plaintiff wanted to introduce evidence that some other 
decision maker, “Y” or “Z,” also acted discriminatorily on other oc-
casions.56 
 
50 See FED. R. EVID. 404 advisory committee‟s note (“The circumstantial use of character 
evidence is generally discouraged because it carries serious risks of prejudice, confusion and 
delay.”); DEBORAH JONES MERRITT & RIC SIMMONS, LEARNING EVIDENCE: FROM THE 
FEDERAL RULES TO THE COURTROOM 313-15 (2d ed. 2011). 
51 FED. R. EVID. 404(b). 
52 Id. 
53 See, e.g., United States v. Zackson, 12 F.3d 1178, 1182-83 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that 
a defendant‟s prior trafficking of narcotics with the co-conspirator was admissible to show 
the defendant‟s intent to work with the co-conspirator). 
54 FED. R. EVID. 404(b). 
55 For further discussion of Rule 404(b), including the difficulty of distinguishing propen-
sity from intent, see MERRITT & SIMMONS, supra note 50, at 342-67. 
56 Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 552 U.S. at 381-82. 
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PROFESSOR MERRITT: The trial judge in Sprint applied a 
hard and fast rule that a plaintiff can never introduce evidence that re-
lates to one manager if she is attempting to prove that another man-
ager engaged in the discrimination.57  The Supreme Court disagreed, 
holding that this type of evidence “is neither per se admissible nor 
per se inadmissible.”58  Instead, relevance depends upon the unique 
facts of each case: There are some cases in which the acts of one 
manager bear upon the intent of another, but other cases in which 
those acts are unrelated.59  This remains a hot issue in employment 
discrimination cases. 
With respect to character evidence, Rule 404(b) is not the on-
ly exception to the character rule.  Character evidence is also admiss-
ible when it is an element of the crime or civil action.60  For example, 
character is an element in child custody cases, because the judge must 
understand the character of the mother and father to determine the 
best interests of the child.  Character is also an element in a defama-
tion case if the allegedly defamatory statement attacks the plaintiff‟s 
character. 
Yet another exception is Rule 406, “Habit Evidence,” which 
allows a party to introduce evidence that a person has a habit of act-
ing in a particular way.61  A “habit” is conduct that a person or busi-
ness engages in on a routine basis.62  Some of these actions may seem 
to establish a person‟s character, but they are admissible as long as 
they occur regularly and routinely enough to constitute habit. 
The Federal Rules of Evidence create special exceptions to 
the general bar on character evidence for both sexual assault and 
child molestation cases.63  These exceptions, which apply in both civ-
 
57 Mendelsohn v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 466 F.3d 1223, 1225 (10th Cir. 2006). 
58 Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 552 U.S. at 381. 
59 Id. at 387. 
60 FED. R. EVID. 404 advisory committee‟s note. 
61 FED. R. EVID. 406. 
62 See FED. R. EVID. 406 advisory committee‟s note (“[Habit] describes one‟s regular re-
sponse to a repeated specific situation.”). 
63 FED. R. EVID. 413(a) (“In a criminal case in which the defendant is accused of an of-
fense of sexual assault, evidence of the defendant‟s commission of another offense or of-
fenses of sexual assault is admissible, and may be considered for its bearing on any matter to 
which it is relevant.”); FED. R. EVID. 414(a) (“In a criminal case in which the defendant is 
accused of an offense of child molestation, evidence of the defendant‟s commission of 
another offense or offenses of child molestation is admissible, and may be considered for its 
bearing on any matter to which it is relevant.”); FED. R. EVID. 415(a) (“In a civil case in 
9
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il and criminal cases, allow a party to introduce evidence of an oppo-
nent‟s prior sexual assaults and child molestations.  Equally impor-
tant, the exceptions allow the party to argue explicitly that these acts 
establish the opponent‟s bad character.  In other words, a prosecutor 
can argue that because the defendant previously molested children, he 
is more likely to be guilty of the current molestation charges. 
When applying all of these character evidence rules, the 
judge‟s preliminary determination under Rule 104 is especially im-
portant.  Suppose that the judge allows a plaintiff in a sex discrimina-
tion trial to introduce evidence that her manager discriminated 
against other women; the judge admits this evidence to prove intent 
under Rule 404(b).  But how much evidence does the plaintiff have to 
introduce about these prior acts?  Does she have to prove by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that they occurred? 
The answer is “no.”64  The plaintiff does not have to prove the 
prior acts of discrimination to get them before the jury; rather she on-
ly has to satisfy the prima facie standard, presenting enough evidence 
that a reasonable jury could find by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the prior discriminatory acts occurred.65  If the plaintiff meets 
that standard, the judge will allow her to present evidence of the al-
leged prior acts of discrimination.  The jury will weigh that evidence 
as part of its overall assessment of the plaintiff‟s case.  The jury may 
find that the prior discrimination occurred, but that the manager 
treated the plaintiff fairly.  Conversely, it may find that the prior acts 
were not discriminatory, but that the manager did discriminate 
against the plaintiff.  The plaintiff must prove her own discrimination 
case by a preponderance of the evidence.  In doing that, she can in-
troduce other acts of alleged discrimination, as long as a reasonable 
jury could find that those acts more likely than not occurred. 
 
PROFESSOR SCHWARTZ: The defendant in such a hypo-
thetical may then seek to introduce evidence to show he did not dis-
criminate in those prior cases, presenting the unwelcoming danger of 
 
which a claim for damages or other relief is predicated on a party‟s alleged commission of 
conduct constituting an offense of sexual assault or child molestation, evidence of that par-
ty‟s commission of another offense or offenses of sexual assault or child molestation is ad-
missible . . . .”). 
64 See FED. R. EVID. 104(b) (requiring merely that evidence introduced be “sufficient” to 
show that the incident actually happened.) 
65 Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 181 (1987); Huddleston v. United States, 485 
U.S. 681, 687 (1988).  See generally MERRITT & SIMMONS, supra note 50, at 406-23. 
10
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the trial judge having to conduct several mini-trials. 
 
PROFESSOR MERRITT: Let us turn briefly now to the rape 
shield rule.  This rule operates in the opposite direction from the ex-
ceptions we have been discussing.  It reinforces the bar on character 
evidence by preventing parties from introducing a particular brand of 
character evidence.66  A male defendant charged with rape, for exam-
ple, cannot argue that the female complainant consented because she 
was a “loose” woman who in the past enjoyed sexual relations with 
other men.  Most judges today would not consider that evidence rele-
vant; the fact that a woman consented to sexual relations with one 
man has no bearing on whether she agreed to have similar relations 
with a different man.  But as a backstop to that, the rape shield rule 
prohibits this type of character evidence about rape victims. 
Courts and legislatures developed rape shield rules for crimi-
nal cases, but the federal rules—and most state rules—apply the pro-
hibition to civil cases as well.67  Suppose, for example, that a plaintiff 
sues her employer for sexual harassment.  The employer may respond 
that the plaintiff welcomed sexual comments in the workplace.  To 
support that defense, some defendants will try to introduce acts of the 
plaintiff‟s sexual behavior outside of the workplace.  In a federal civil 
case, the defendant can introduce that type of evidence only if the 
probative value of the evidence substantially outweighs the prejudice 
to the plaintiff.68  Many judges have struck that balance by holding 
that actions outside the workplace on the plaintiff‟s own time are un-
likely to be sufficiently probative to be admitted.69  Potential plain-
 
66 See FED. R. EVID. 412(a) (“The following evidence is not admissible in any civil or 
criminal proceeding involving alleged sexual misconduct except as provided in subdivisions 
(b) and (c): 
 (1) Evidence offered to prove that any alleged victim engaged in other sexual behavior. 
 (2) Evidence offered to prove any alleged victim‟s sexual predisposition.”). 
67 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 412(a) (“[E]vidence is not admissible in any civil or criminal 
proceeding involving alleged sexual misconduct . . . .”); CAL. EVID. CODE § 783 (governing 
admissibility of the plaintiff‟s sexual conduct “[i]n any civil action alleging conduct which 
constitutes sexual harassment, sexual assault, or sexual battery . . . .”). 
68 FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(2). 
69 See, e.g., B.K.B. v. Maui Police Dep‟t, 276 F.3d 1091, 1105 (9th Cir. 2002) (excluding 
the plaintiff‟s outside-of-work activities); Wolak v. Spucci, 217 F.3d 157, 160 (2d Cir. 2000) 
(same); Excel Corp. v. Bosley, 165 F.3d 635, 641 (8th Cir. 1999) (“[W]e cannot find that the 
district court abused its discretion in refusing to admit into the record, evidence of alleged 
sexual relations between Bosley and Johnson outside the workplace.”); Rodriguez-
Hernandez v. Miranda-Velez, 132 F.3d 848, 856 (1st Cir. 1998) (holding that evidence of the 
plaintiff‟s relationship with a married man was not admissible because it took place outside 
11
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tiffs, in other words, can swear at home without giving up objections 
to harassing language at work. 
 
PROFESSOR SCHWARTZ: There are two issues present.  
One is the admissibility of evidence of a person‟s character, which 
under the Federal Rules of Evidence is usually done by reputation or 
opinion evidence.70  New York, however, allows only reputation evi-
dence to prove character.71  The second issue, which should be ana-
lyzed separately, is the admissibility of other acts.72  One should sep-
arate these two issues because they are often treated separately in the 
rules and by the courts.73  Even in the rape shield rule, there are sepa-
rate references to sexual behavior and sexual predisposition.74  Addi-
tionally, there is a specific reference in the rules to evidence of an al-
leged victim‟s reputation.75  Therefore, even though there are obvious 
relationships between other act and character evidence, it is helpful to 
separate them for the purposes of analysis. 
 
PROFESSOR MERRITT: Rule 408, which governs state-
ments made during settlement discussions, is the next Article IV rule 
we will examine.  Rule 408 forbids parties from using statements 
made during settlement negotiations to prove liability.76  There are 
four key points about this rule.  First, the rule bans these statements 
 
the workplace). 
70 FED. R. EVID. 405(a). 
71 See People v. Bouton, 405 N.E.2d 699, 703 (N.Y. 1980) (“[R]eputation . . . is the raw 
material from which that character may be established.”). 
72 See FED. R. EVID. 404(b). 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the 
character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.  It 
may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of mo-
tive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or ab-
sence of mistake or accident, provided that upon request by the accused, 
the prosecution in a criminal case shall provide reasonable notice in ad-
vance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial notice on good 
cause shown, of the general nature of any such evidence it intends to in-
troduce at trial. 
Id. 
73 Compare FED. R. EVID. 404(a) (describing character evidence), with id. 404(b) (de-
scribing “[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts”). 
74 Compare FED. R. EVID. 412(a)(1) (describing a victim‟s prior sexual behavior as inad-
missible), with id. 412(a)(2) (describing a victim‟s sexual predisposition as inadmissible). 
75 See FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(2) (“Evidence of an alleged victim‟s reputation is admissible 
only if it has been placed in controversy by the alleged victim.”). 
76 FED. R. EVID. 408(a). 
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no matter who offers them.  Sometimes a party wants to offer his own 
statement from a settlement negotiation because he believes it shows 
good faith; Rule 408, however, prohibits the party from doing this.77 
Second, note that Rule 408 only protects statements made 
during compromise negotiations.78  Unilateral offers from one side to 
the other before lawyers are even involved do not constitute settle-
ment negotiations.79  Often in employment discrimination cases, the 
employer will offer the employee a tempting deal at the same time 
the employee is terminated.  The employee can usually use the em-
ployer‟s offer as evidence at trial, because it occurred before the on-
set of any settlement discussions.80 
Third, Rule 408 does allow introduction of statements from 
settlement negotiations when a party offers the statement for some 
purpose other than proving liability.81  One of the most common 
“other” purposes is bias.  If two different plaintiffs sue the same de-
fendant, and the defendant settles with one of the plaintiffs, that 
plaintiff may be willing to come into court and testify on behalf of 
the defendant.  In this situation, the other plaintiff can introduce evi-
dence of the settlement in order to show that the witness who settled 
her claim may be biased.
 82  Depending on how her settlement was 
structured, the witness may even have a financial interest in helping 
the defendant avoid liability to other plaintiffs. 
Finally, Rule 408 protects discussions in civil settlements 
from admission in both civil and criminal trials.83  When a drunk 
driver negotiates a civil settlement with an injured victim, the driver‟s 
statements during that negotiation are not admissible in any criminal 
trial.84  The only exception is when a party‟s civil negotiation occurs 
 
77 Id. (evidence is “not admissible on behalf of any party”). 
78 Id. 408(a)(2) (“conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations” are “not ad-
missible ”). 
79 See, e.g., Lee Middleton Original Dolls, Inc. v. Seymour Mann, Inc., 299 F. Supp. 2d 
892, 895 (E.D. Wis. 2004) (determining that one party‟s unilateral offer was not a compro-
mise negotiation for purposes of the rule). 
80 See, e.g., Seasonwein v. First Montauk Secs. Corp., 324 Fed. Appx. 160, 162 (3d Cir. 
2009); Cassino v. Reichhold Chems., Inc., 817 F.2d 1338, 1342-43 (9th Cir. 1987). 
81 FED. R. EVID. 408(b). 
82 See id. (listing bias as a permissible purpose). 
83 FED. R. EVID. 408 advisory committee‟s note; United States v. Davis, 596 F.3d 852, 
860 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
84 See United States v. Bailey, 327 F.3d 1131, 1146 (10th Cir. 2003) (holding that Rule 
408 bars settlement discussions in criminal cases because, in part, “the potential prejudicial 
effect of the admission of evidence of a settlement can be . . . devastating to a criminal de-
13
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with a government agency.85  Under those circumstances, statements 
from the civil settlement negotiations are admissible in any criminal 
trial.  This is very important to remember if you represent a client 
who is under investigation by the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion; the Federal Drug Administration; or any other federal, state, or 
local agency acting in its regulatory authority.  Statements made dur-
ing those settlement discussions are admissible in any criminal trial. 
IV. HEARSAY AND ITS EXCEPTIONS 
PROFESSOR SCHWARTZ: Hearsay is any out-of-court 
statement—anything other than what was said on the witness stand—
that is offered in court “to prove the truth of the matter asserted” in 
the statement.86  Therefore, an out-of-court statement is not hearsay 
when it is not offered in court to prove the truth of the fact asserted 
but rather is only offered to prove that the out-of-court statement was 
made.87 
 
HON. WILLIAM G. YOUNG: The trial judge must then ask 
himself whether the mere fact that the statement was made is inde-
pendently relevant.88  Where a witness hears the event and then 
comes to court to testify, there is not a hearsay problem because one 
can cross-examine him about his ability to hear, how far he was 
away, what the ambient background noise was, etc.89  One can also 
cross-examine him as to his bias and motive for testifying.90  Howev-
er, if one hears an event, speaks about it, and is overheard by another 
person who then becomes the witness at trial, the situation will be 
different.91  There would be a hearsay problem in the second scenario 
because one cannot cross-examine the out-of-court declarant.92 
 
fendant . . . .”); United States  v. Meadows, 598 F.2d 984, 989 (5th Cir. 1979) (“Rule 408 . . . 
govern[s] the admission of related civil settlement negotiations in a criminal trial.”). 
85 FED. R. EVID. 408(a)(2). 
86 FED. R. EVID. 801(c). 
87 See, e.g., Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211, 220 (1974). 
88 Id. at 221. 
89 See United States v. Deeb, 13 F.3d 1532, 1539 (11th Cir. 1994) (discussing the uses of 
cross-examination). 
90 Id. (requiring that “the cross-examination probe[] the witness‟s motive or inducement to 
lie . . . .”). 
91 See United States v. Daniels, 572 F.2d 535, 539 (5th Cir. 1978) (discussing the differ-
ences between single level and double level hearsay). 
92 Id. 
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There are four different categories of exceptions to hearsay, 
each of which depend on the status of the declarant.93  In the first cat-
egory, the declarant is the witness.94  In the second category, the dec-
larant is the adverse party and this is governed by Rule 801(d)(2).95  
The third category, which comes directly from the common law, con-
tains the “reliable exceptions” and is governed by Rule 803.96  The 
fourth category contains the “necessary exceptions.”97  To fall within 
the fourth category, one must first prove that the declarant is unavail-
able.98 
 
PROFESSOR SCHWARTZ: If the out-of-court statement is 
admissible under Rule 801, it is a hearsay exemption.99  One exemp-
tion which has been occurring frequently in civil cases is the admis-
sibility of an employee‟s statement against her employer, referred to 
as a “vicarious admission.”100  The proponent has two possibilities for 
introducing the employee‟s statement against the employer. 
The first, Rule 801(d)(2)(C), is a codification of the common 
law “speaking authority” rule.101  Under this rule, if the employee has 
the authority to speak about the particular subject, then the em-
ployee‟s statement is admissible against the employer, and this is ac-
cepted in New York law as well.102  Not accepted in New York, but 
accepted under the Federal Rules of Evidence, is the second possibili-
ty.  Where the proponent is not able to show that the employee had 
speaking authority, then under Rule 801(d)(2), the proponent may be 
 
The admission of double level hearsay . . . creates far greater obstacles to 
the accused‟s right to confront the witnesses against him than does the 
admission of single level hearsay.  When a witness‟ testimony consti-
tutes single level hearsay, the defense attorney can cross-examine that 
witness concerning the reliability and good faith of the source of the evi-
dence against the defendant.  When a witness‟ testimony constitutes 
double level hearsay, however, even this safeguard is unavailable.  This 
situation certainly creates grave possibilities for abuse. 
Id. 
93 FED. R. EVID. 801(d). 
94 Id. 801(d)(1). 
95 Id. 801(d)(2). 
96 FED. R. EVID. 803. 
97 FED. R. EVID. 804(b). 
98 Id. 
99 Bourjaily, 483 U.S. at 187. 
100 See, e.g., Dunnom v. Bennett, 290 F. Supp. 2d 860, 870-71 n.1 (S.D. Ohio 2003). 
101 FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(C). 
102 Id.; N.Y.C.P.L.R. 4517 (McKinney 2001). 
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able to convince the judge that the employee made a statement that 
concerned the subject matter of the employment.103  In addition to the 
requirement that the statement must be concerned with the subject 
matter of the employment, the statement must also be made by the 
employee during the time he is employed.104  For example, if an au-
tomobile repair mechanic made a statement about the brakes on a 
truck, the employee‟s statement may be admitted against the employ-
er because the statement was about the subject matter of the employ-
ment, even if the employee does not have the authority to speak.  
However, New York law does not recognize this second possibili-
ty.105 
This issue recently arose in the Barry Bonds prosecution.106  
Barry Bonds‟ trainer, Greg Anderson, who refused to testify in court, 
made some out-of-court statements that the prosecutor wanted to in-
troduce.107  The Ninth Circuit held that the statement was not admiss-
ible against Barry Bonds because the trainer was neither an agent nor 
an employee of Barry Bonds, but instead was an independent con-
tractor.108  This raises the additional issue of how one would deter-
mine whether the declarant is an agent or employee of the party 
against whom the statement is sought to be introduced.109  In Barry 
Bonds‟ case, the Ninth Circuit turned to common law principles and 
relied on the Third Restatement of Agency for the conclusion that an 
athletic trainer is to be considered an independent contractor, not an 
employee.110 
 
 
103 FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(D). 
104 Id. 
105 See Loschiavo v. Port Auth. of N.Y. and N.J., 448 N.E.2d 1351, 1352 (1983) (accept-
ing statements made only “within the scope of [an employee‟s] authority”). 
106 United States v. Bonds, 608 F.3d 495 (9th Cir. 2010). 
107 Id. at 498. 
108 Id. at 504. 
109 Id. at 504-07 (discussing ten factors enumerated in the Second Restatement of Agency 
that a court should consider in their totality, with no one factor being dispositive or having 
any particular importance over another). 
110 Id. at 504-05. 
Although the parties presented this issue primarily under the Second 
Restatement, we have independently reviewed the Third Restatement, 
which abandons the term independent contractor. . . .  We find nothing in 
the later Restatement‟s provisions that would materially change our 
analysis or cause us to reach a different result than the district court. 
Bonds, 608 F.3d at 504-05. 
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PROFESSOR MERRITT: One of the most widely used hear-
say exceptions is state of mind.  In one sense, this exception is quite 
broad.  It allows a party to introduce the declarant‟s then-existing 
state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition.111  Examples 
of admissible statements are: “I‟m hungry,” “I‟m sleepy,” “I‟m 
bored,” “I‟m scared,” and any other reference to what is occurring in-
side the person‟s mind.  But in another sense, this exception is quite 
narrow: It does not allow the party to admit the reasons behind the 
speaker‟s state of mind.112 
A classic example of this occurs when a homicide victim 
makes a statement a few days or weeks before the homicide, indicat-
ing that she was afraid of the person later accused of the killing.  
Suppose, for example, that a woman was murdered, and her husband 
was charged with the crime.  The victim‟s best friend may want to 
testify that just a week before the murder, the victim said: “I feel so 
afraid, because my husband acts like he will kill me.” 
Under the state-of-mind exception, a judge would admit the 
first part of this statement because the friend is describing the vic-
tim‟s mental state at the time she spoke—she was afraid.113  But the 
second part of the statement is not admissible because the reason for 
the victim‟s fear is not part of her state of mind.114  The prosecutor 
can draw some advantage from the first part of the statement: The 
victim‟s fear may fit with other evidence to suggest that she feared 
her husband.  But the most useful part of the victim‟s statement—
from the prosecutor‟s perspective—is not admissible. 
A hypothetical based loosely on the facts in Leelanau Wine 
Cellars, Ltd. v. Black & Red, Inc.115 illustrates a different attempt to 
use the state-of-mind exception.  In that case, one wine company 
sued another for trademark infringement.  Both companies used the 
word “Leelanau,” which refers to a Michigan peninsula, on their 
products.  Imagine that as part of the trademark case, the plaintiff‟s 
manager testifies that a customer told him, “I know your Leelanau 
 
111 FED. R. EVID. 803(3). 
112 See id. (excluding statements derived from memory). 
113 Cf. United States v. Joe, 8 F.3d 1488, 1491 (10th Cir. 1993) (admitting deceased wife‟s 
statement to doctor that she was “afraid sometimes”). 
114 Id. at 1492-93 (holding that the wife‟s explanation of why she was afraid did not fall 
within the state-of-mind exception) (citing United States v. Rodriguez-Pando, 841 F.2d 
1014, 1019 (10th Cir. 1988)). 
115 502 F.3d 504 (6th Cir. 2007). 
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wine!  I tried it at the Michigan State Fair.”116  The plaintiff wants to 
introduce this statement because it did not sell its wine at the fair; on-
ly the defendant sold wine at the fair.  The plaintiff, therefore, will 
argue that the statement shows customer confusion, an element of 
trademark infringement. 
The customer‟s statement occurred outside the courtroom; he 
is not present to defend or explain the statement.  If the plaintiff in-
troduces the customer‟s statement for the truth of the matter as-
serted—that he tried a wine named “Leelanau” at the state fair—then 
it is classic hearsay.117  The plaintiff may argue that the statement ex-
presses the customer‟s state of mind, but that exception will not serve 
the plaintiff‟s purposes.  The first part of the statement, “I know your 
Leelanau wine,” is admissible as an expression of the customer‟s 
contemporaneous state of mind; at the time he spoke, the customer 
was remembering an image of the wine.  But the second part of the 
statement—“I tried it at the Michigan state fair”—is not admissible 
under this (or any other) hearsay exception.  The second part of the 
statement offers the reason why the customer remembered the wine; 
recall that reasons are not admissible under the state-of-mind excep-
tion. 
But the trademark plaintiff has another option here.  The 
winery can offer the customer‟s statement, not to prove the truth of 
the matter asserted (that a Leelanau wine was sold at the Michigan 
State Fair), but to show that the customer believed that the plaintiff‟s 
wine was sold at the fair.  When combined with other evidence estab-
lishing that only the defendant‟s wine appeared at the fair, this belief 
will support the plaintiff‟s argument that customers confused the two 
wines.118 
This example illustrates that although reasons are not admiss-
ible under the state-of-mind exception, parties sometimes can achieve 
 
116 In the actual case, the plaintiff relied upon similar anecdotes.  See Leelanau Wine Cel-
lars, 502 F.3d at 519 (discussing testimony about a business association that believed that 
the plaintiff was participating in a food and wine festival, when the defendant was the actual 
participant). 
117 FED. R. EVID. 801(C) (“ „Hearsay‟ is a statement, other than one made by the declarant 
while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter 
asserted.”). 
118 See Leelanau Wine Cellars, 502 F.3d at 515 (explaining how liability for trademark 
infringement hinges on whether or not the “ „defendant‟s use of the disputed mark is likely to 
cause confusion among consumers regarding the origin of the goods offered by the           
parties.‟ ” (quoting Daddy‟s Junky Music Stores, Inc. v. Big Daddy‟s Family Music Ctr., 109 
F.3d 275, 280 (6th Cir. 1997))). 
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the same result by introducing a state-of-mind expression to show 
that the speaker believed a particular matter—regardless of whether it 
was true.  This will not work in every case, but the technique is par-
ticularly helpful when an out-of-court declarant‟s beliefs are relevant 
to the case. 
The state-of-mind exception includes another twist that 
troubles many lawyers.  Statements that are forward-looking, which 
talk about one‟s future plans, are admissible under this exception.119  
The declarant‟s expressed intention, in turn, offers circumstantial 
evidence that the declarant did, in fact, do that thing.  The Supreme 
Court allowed this use of the state-of-mind exception in the infamous 
nineteenth-century case, Mutual Life Insurance Co. of New York v. 
Hillmon,120 and the Federal Rules preserve that ruling.121 
A more difficult question arises when the declarant includes 
another person in the stated plan.  Suppose, for example, that Kate 
tells her mother that she plans to meet John at the gym.  If Kate is 
murdered at the gym and the state charges John with the crime, the 
prosecutor will want to admit Kate‟s out-of-court statement as cir-
cumstantial evidence that she met John at the place she was mur-
dered.  The statement, however, offers questionable evidence that 
Kate actually met John at the gym: Kate might have misunderstood 
John‟s intent, John might have intended to meet Kate but changed his 
mind, John might have lied to Kate, or John might have planned to 
meet Kate but got stuck in traffic.  One person‟s statement about 
another person‟s intent is much less reliable than the person‟s state-
ment about her own intent. 
The Supreme Court in Hillmon nonetheless held that this type 
of statement, one that expresses a plan involving a third party, is ad-
missible.122  The common law, therefore, included references to a 
 
119 FED R. EVID. 803(3).  However, a judge may conclude that some of these statements 
are so tentative that they are inadmissible under FED R. EVID. 403.  A declarant who makes 
the statement in March that he plans to go shopping in June, for example, may not have 
made a sufficiently probative statement about what he will be doing in June.  But as a gener-
al matter, a declarant‟s statement about what he personally intends to do is admissible under 
the state-of-mind exception. 
120 145 U.S. 285, 299-300 (1892) (holding that decedent‟s letters, which expressed an in-
tent to do an act in the future, were admissible evidence to show that the act was actually 
done). 
121 FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee‟s note (“The rule of Mutual Life Insurance Co. 
v. Hillmon, . . . allowing evidence of intention as tending to prove the doing of the act in-
tended, is, of course, left undisturbed.”). 
122 Hillmon, 145 U.S. at 299-300.  The issue in Hillmon centered on whether a body found 
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third party‟s actions within the state-of-mind exception.  Federal Rule 
of Evidence 803(3) may have intended to reverse this part of Hill-
mon.123  But the rule‟s language is ambiguous, and several federal 
courts have admitted references to third parties under the state-of-
mind exception.124 
Some of these courts, including the Second Circuit, do require 
corroborating evidence before admitting Hillmon-like references to 
third parties.125  The party offering evidence under the state-of-mind 
exception does not have to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
third party took the planned action, but the party must offer some 
evidence of the third party‟s action apart from the hearsay state-
ment.126 
 
PROFESSOR SCHWARTZ: The New York State courts take 
this approach as well.127 
 
PROFESSOR MERRITT: I will discuss one other common 
hearsay exception: statements made for the purpose of medical diag-
nosis or treatment.128  This exception is gaining prominence because 
prosecutors often use these statements in domestic violence and child 
abuse cases.129  If the victim refuses to testify—or is too young to tes-
tify competently—the prosecutor may rely upon statements that the 
victim made to a doctor as a way of proving what types of injuries 
 
at Crooked Creek, Kansas, was that of an insured man named Hillmon or that of another man 
named Walters.  Id. at 294.  The insurance company claimed that the body belonged to Wal-
ters and sought to introduce letters that Walters allegedly wrote to his fiancée.  Id.  In those 
letters, Walters mentioned that he intended to travel with Hillmon in a direction that included 
Crooked Creek.  Id.  The Court held that the letters—including the references to Hillmon—
were admissible hearsay because they expressed Walters‟ state of mind.  Id. at 295. 
123 See H.R. REP. NO. 93-650, at 13 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7075, 7087. 
124 See, e.g., United States v. Barraza, 576 F.3d 798, 804-05 (8th Cir. 2009); United States 
v. Pheaster, 544 F.2d 353, 375-80 (9th Cir. 1976). 
125 See, e.g., United States v. Best, 219 F.3d 192, 198-99 (2d Cir. 2000) (relying upon cor-
roborating testimony to admit hearsay statement referring to third party‟s intent). 
126 Id. at 199. 
127 See, e.g., People v. James, 717 N.E.2d 1052 (N.Y. 1999) (discussing the corroboration 
standard New York takes with respect to hearsay testimony). 
128 FED. R. EVID. 803(4). 
129 See, e.g., United States v. Renville, 779 F.2d 430, 436-37 (8th Cir. 1985) (“Statements 
by a child abuse victim to a physician during an examination that the abuser is a member of 
the victim‟s immediate household are reasonably pertinent to treatment.”).  See generally 
MERRITT & SIMMONS, supra note 50, at 533-35 (discussing application of Rule 803(4) to 
domestic violence and child abuse cases). 
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were suffered.130  Even when the victim testifies, statements to medi-
cal providers offer important supporting evidence.  Civil litigants also 
use these statements to substantiate claims of abuse. 
The medical treatment exception admits hearsay statements 
made for the purpose of medical diagnosis or treatment if the state-
ment was “reasonably pertinent” to the diagnosis or treatment.131  The 
exception rests on the assumption that patients are unlikely to lie to 
medical providers when seeking needed treatment.  The “reasonably 
pertinent” restriction stems from that rationale.  Doctors cannot report 
all statements made by talkative patients; they can only recount ones 
that were “reasonably pertinent” to the treatment. 
This caveat is not as restrictive as lawyers sometimes believe.  
If a patient seeks emergency treatment for a broken nose, the doctor 
must understand how the injury occurred to treat the patient effective-
ly.  Fractures from a fall may differ from those stemming from a fist 
fight.  Equally important, the doctor must determine whether the cur-
rent injury relates to an underlying pathology.  If the broken nose re-
sulted from a fall, the patient may be developing muscle weakness, 
neurologic impairment, low blood pressure, or a host of other diseas-
es that require treatment.  Many facts are reasonably pertinent to 
medical treatment. 
On the other hand, if a third party caused the patient‟s injury, 
the third party‟s identity usually is not reasonably pertinent to medi-
cal treatment.  The doctor may need to know that the broken nose 
stemmed from a fall and that the patient fell because someone pushed 
her, because both of these facts help the doctor treat the nose and any 
underlying pathology.  However, the attacker‟s identity is less clearly 
linked to medical treatment.  In domestic violence or child abuse cas-
es, therefore, this exception traditionally had limited utility: It al-
lowed evidence identifying the injury, but not the attacker.132 
Two recent trends are expanding this exception, making it 
more powerful in domestic violence and child abuse cases.  First, the 
exception applies to psychological treatment as well as physical 
care.133  Suppose that a battered wife visits her psychotherapist and 
 
130 See, e.g., United States v. Nick, 604 F.2d 1199, 1201-02 (9th Cir. 1979) (admitting a 
doctor‟s testimony of a child‟s declarations to establish cause of injury, without the name of 
the assailant, because such testimony is expressly allowable under the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence). 
131 FED. R. EVID. 803(4). 
132 See, e.g., Nick, 604 F.2d at 1201-02. 
133 See, e.g., United States v. Newman, 965 F.2d 206, 210 (7th Cir. 1992). 
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says, “My husband hit me with a bottle, and I keep re-imagining the 
scene—I can‟t get it out of my head.”  This statement will help the 
therapist diagnose post-traumatic stress disorder in the wife.  To un-
derstand and treat that stress, moreover, the therapist must know the 
identity of the attacker.  A husband‟s repeated attacks have a different 
psychological effect than a one-time mugging by a stranger.  When 
using the medical treatment exception to admit statements made to 
psychologists, some courts have included the perpetrator‟s identity, 
finding it “reasonably pertinent” to treatment.134 
The second recent trend stems from medicine itself.  Doctors 
now view victims of child abuse or domestic violence as patients suf-
fering from distinctive diseases.135  Abuse incidents, doctors have ar-
gued, are not isolated situations; they reflect an ongoing disease that 
victims and the health care system must tackle together.136  Prosecu-
tors have adapted this argument for the courtroom, contending that an 
abuser‟s identity is relevant to the victim‟s medical treatment.  A 
child cannot be treated for sexual abuse without uncovering the per-
petrator, stopping the ongoing abuse, and addressing the child‟s rela-
tionship to the perpetrator.  A few courts have accepted this argument 
in child abuse cases, admitting the abuser‟s identity under the medi-
cal treatment exception.137  The argument has been less successful in 
domestic violence cases, but one court accepted it after the abuse vic-
tim died from her injuries.138 
 
PROFESSOR SCHWARTZ: The business record exception is 
another exception to the rule against hearsay, and the elements of this 
 
134 See, e.g., United States v. Kappell, 418 F.3d 550, 556-57 (6th Cir. 2005) (admitting 
identification that victims of child sexual abuse made to a psychotherapist while obtaining 
treatment); United States v. McHorse, 179 F.3d 889, 900-01 (10th Cir. 1999) (admitting 
identifications that victim of child molestation made to physician and psychotherapist; not-
ing reliability of these statements when made while seeking treatment). 
135 See Sherry A. Falsetti, Screening and Responding to Family and Intimate Partner Vi-
olence in the Primary Care Setting, 34 PRIMARY CARE: CLINICS IN OFFICE PRACTICE 641, 642 
(2007) (describing family and intimate partner violence as a disease with “both acute and 
chronic health effects.”). 
136 Id. (advocating screening and more aggressive treatment of family violence diseases); 
Robert S. Thompson & Richard Krugman, Screening Mothers for Intimate Partner Abuse at 
Well-Baby Care Visits, 285 J.A.M.A. 1628, 1630 (2001) (“The time to act is now.  If inti-
mate partner abuse were a new cancer affecting one quarter of adults, the money would be 
found.  It should be found now for family violence.”). 
137 See, e.g., United States v. Balfany, 965 F.2d 575, 579-80 (8th Cir. 1992); United States 
v. George, 960 F.2d 97, 99-100 (9th Cir. 1992). 
138 Joe, 8 F.3d at 1495. 
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exception are listed in Rule 803(6).139  The New York Court of Ap-
peals addressed a recurring issue involving this exception in Johnson 
v. Lutz,140 where it answered the question of what happens when the 
information on the business record comes from someone outside of 
the business entity who did not have a business duty to transmit the 
information.141  Courts consistently hold that under these circums-
tances, the admissibility of the record depends on whether there is a 
hearsay exemption or exception that covers that transmittal of the in-
formation.142  The rationale is that such an exemption or exception 
would substitute for the absent business duty to transmit.  Therefore, 
in these circumstances, the admissibility of the business record de-
pends upon the proponent being able to piece together two hearsay 
exceptions (i.e., the business record exception and an exception or 
exemption for the transmittal of the information). 
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, there is a separate pub-
lic records hearsay exception.143  Sometimes, when government 
records are introduced, federal judges refer to the business record rule 
as though the public record exception did not even exist.  However, 
there is, in fact, a separate public record exception, which encom-
passes a specific hearsay exception for governmental investigatory 
reports.144  The key to the admissibility of these investigatory reports 
is their “trustworthiness.”145  The Advisory Committee‟s note to this 
rule lists some of the factors that a judge should consider in determin-
ing the reliability of an investigatory report: the timeliness of the in-
vestigation, the expertise and experience of the investigators, the pro-
cedures that the investigators used, and whether there are 
motivational problems, such as whether the investigation was under-
taken and the report prepared with an eye toward litigation.146  This is 
an especially important hearsay exception because if the report is 
 
139 FED. R. EVID. 803(6). 
140 170 N.E. 517 (N.Y. 1930). 
141 Id. at 518 (stating that the memorandum was not admissible because it was not made 
during the normal course of business). 
142 Hochhauser v. Elec. Ins. Co., 844 N.Y.S.2d 374, 377 (App. Div. 2007) (stating that a 
statement is admissible only if the evidence “ „falls within one of the recognized exceptions 
to the hearsay rule . . . ‟ ” and it is reliable). 
143 FED. R. EVID. 803(8). 
144 Id. 803(8)(C). 
145 Id.; Fox v. United States, 934 F. Supp. 1133, 1137 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (admitting the 
Coast Guard investigatory report into evidence if it meets the “trustworthiness standard” set 
forth by the Supreme Court). 
146 Colvin v. United States, 479 F.2d 998, 1001 n.3 (9th Cir. 1973). 
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admissible, it can carry great weight with the jury since it carries the 
imprimatur of a governmental agency. 
In Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey,147 the Supreme Court held 
that an investigatory report containing findings of fact pursuant to an 
investigation authorized by law may be admissible even if it contains 
a conclusion or an opinion.148  There are circuit court decisions that 
interpret the Beech Aircraft decision to apply only to factual conclu-
sions but not to legal conclusions.149  However, it is not always clear 
whether a conclusion is factual or legal.  For example, if a report 
states that a police officer‟s use of force was unreasonable, it may be 
debatable whether such a statement is a factual conclusion or a legal 
conclusion.  The answer will likely depend on the context in which 
the word “reasonable” was used, i.e., whether it was used in a lay fac-
tual sense or in a legal sense. 
An investigatory report is potentially admissible in civil cases 
and in criminal cases when the criminal defendant offers it into evi-
dence, but not when the government does so.150  Lastly, this hearsay 
exception does not admit all of the underlying data and information 
upon which the findings of fact in the investigatory report were 
based.151  Another hearsay exception or exemption would have to 
cover the underlying data or information.152 
 
147 488 U.S. 153 (1988). 
148 Id. at 162. 
149 Sullivan v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 623 F.3d 770, 777 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Pure legal 
conclusions are not admissible as factual findings.”); Hines v. Brandon Steel Decks, Inc., 
886 F.2d 299, 303 (11th Cir. 1989) (“Legal conclusions are inadmissible because the jury 
would have no way of knowing whether the preparer of the report was cognizant of the re-
quirements underlying the legal conclusion and, if not, whether the preparer might have a 
higher or lower standard than the law requires.”); Zeus Enters. v. Alphin Aircraft, Inc., 190 
F.3d 238, 243 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that the evidence was not admissible under the inves-
tigatory hearsay exception because the evidence “involved no factual determinations and 
was strictly a legal ruling”). 
150 Ross P. Masler, The Second Circuit Review—1987-1988 Term: Evidence: The Tower-
ing Inferno: Trustworthiness of the Tower Report Under Federal Rule of Evidence 
803(8)(C): United States v. Durrani, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 625, 639 (1989) (stating that evi-
dence admitted under the public records exception are presumed admissible and the burden 
is on the opposing party to challenge its trustworthiness). 
151 City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co., 538 F. Supp. 1257, 1271 (N.D. 
Ohio 1980). 
152 FED. R. EVID. 803(6). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Relevance, unfair prejudice, character evidence, and hearsay 
are the four cornerstones of trial evidence.  These principles have go-
verned Anglo-American law for centuries, but they continue to 
evolve.  In recent years, employment discrimination suits fueled new 
rulings on relevance and character evidence, while the Barry Bonds‟ 
prosecution tested the boundaries of party-opponent hearsay.  New 
legal claims and courtroom disputes will similarly reshape eviden-
tiary rules in the years to come. 
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